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 1 
THE EASY ARGUMENT  
 
To say that knowledge is closed under entailment is to say that the following principle 
(perhaps with qualifications) is correct:  
K: If, while knowing p, subject S believes q because S knows that p entails q, 
then S knows q. 
This principle that knowledge is closed under entailment, K, has been challenged on the 
basis of cases like the following.   
Table Case:  Ted is in an ordinary house in good viewing conditions and believes 
red, his table is red, entirely because he sees his table and its color; he also 
believes not-white, it is false that his table is white and illuminated by a red light, 
because not-white is entailed by red (Stewart Cohen 2002).  
Car Case:  Sam has parked his car in typical (un-Gettierized) circumstances and 
believes car, his car is parked outside, because he just left it there; he believes 
not-(not-car & dreaming), he is not merely dreaming his car is parked outside, 
because it follows from car (Gilbert Harman and Brett Sherman (2004). 
Given the strength of his epistemic position vis-à-vis red, Ted seems to know red; 
similarly, Sam’s epistemic position seems strong vis-à-vis car, so strong, in fact, that he 
appears to know car.  But it may seem too easy for Ted to know not-white by deducing it 
from red, which he believes via perception; and too easy for Sam to know not-(not-car & 
dreaming) by deducing it from car, given his epistemic position vis-à-vis car.  And these 
impressions are at odds with K, despite K’s own obvious intuitive appeal.  These 
examples and the like (which we may call hard cases) illustrate an interesting problem, 
namely, the following three claims clash but each seems plausible: 
1. Ted’s epistemic position is strong enough for him to know red. 
2. Ted cannot know not-white on the basis of red. 
3. The epistemic closure principle, suitably restricted, is true.  
Other examples (discussed later) illustrate how intuition can suggest that our epistemic 
position is strong enough for us to know things that fail to position us to know other 
things for which the former provide powerful inductive support.  Stewart Cohen (2002) 
has called this three-way clash of intuitions the problem of easy knowledge.   
A skeptical response to the problem would be to accept 2 and 3 and reject 1.  
Those who hope to avoid skepticism appear to have two options. 
According to the hard argument, the best response is to reject K, and maintain 
that while Ted and Sam know red and car, they know neither not-white nor not-(not-car 
& dreaming).  A second response is to say that, despite appearances, Ted knows not-
white, and Sam knows not-(not-car & dreaming).  Here we reject the assumption that in 
the hard cases knowledge of not-white and of not-(not-car & dreaming) comes too easily.  
Call this the easy argument.  But there may be a third alternative.  Perhaps we can 
eliminate the possibility that a belief can too easily be known on the basis of another by 
tightening our requirements for knowing the latter slightly, not enough to put ourselves in 
danger of substantial skeptical consequences, and without abandoning K.  On this 
approach, we say the reason why it is too easy for Ted to know not-white by deducing it 
from red is that Ted does not know red to begin with, and similarly for Sam.  We say that 
Ted’s epistemic position vis-a-vis red does not suffice for knowledge, since he cannot 
know red merely by seeing that his table appears red, but he can easily improve his 
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epistemic position enough to know red.  Thus what is needed is an account of knowledge 
that is strong enough to nip the possibility of easy knowledge in the bud, but not so strong 
as to prevent people from knowing things using their senses. Admittedly, this concedes 
ground to the skeptic, but perhaps the price is worth paying if we can avoid easy 
knowledge and retain K.  I will call this approach the reverse argument. 
 In this essay I take on two tasks.  In Part 1 I put aside the hard argument and 
criticize a recent version of the reverse argument.  I claim that the reverse approach to the 
problem of easy knowledge leads back to skepticism after all.  In Part 2 I criticize one 
version of the hard argument.  My criticisms help support the easy argument, in that they 
chip away at its alternatives.  However, all three arguments have awkward consequences.  
My thought is that it is easiest to live with the awkward consequences of the easy 
argument. 
 
The Reverse Strategy 
Assuming that knowledge can be analyzed in the way the reverse theorist expects (i.e., 
we can find an account that nips ‘easy’ knowledge in the bud without denying K and 
without substantial skeptical consequences), it will be possible to criticize any account 
that permits instances of easy knowledge, such as Ted’s knowing not-white in the Table 
Case. But a successful reverse argument against an analysis must do more than show that 
the analysis tolerates easy knowledge.  For it is possible that no plausible account rules 
lives up to the expectations of the reverse theorist, and it is idle to object to an account on 
the grounds that it fails to do what no plausible account can.  I will argue that the reverse 
strategy I consider does not live up to the expectations of the reverse strategists 
themselves.  I will then suggest (but not demonstrate) that the failure was inevitable since 
any account that is strong enough to avoid easy knowledge is so strong as to have 
implausible skeptical consequences.  The upshot is clear:  its compatibility with easy 
knowledge is not grounds to reject an account.   
 I will consider a version of the reverse argument deployed by Richard Fumerton 
(1995) and Jonathan Vogel (2000) against various reliabilist accounts of knowledge.  
They object to reliabilism because it permits a pattern of reasoning Vogel calls 
‘bootstrapping,' and bootstrapping generates knowledge too easily.  Vogel (p. 614) offers 
the following example.  Roxanne “believes implicitly what her gas gauge says, without 
knowing that the gauge is reliable.  . . .When the gauge reads ‘F’, she believes that, on 
this occasion, the tank is full.  She also believes that, on this occasion, the gauge reads 
‘F’.”  Combining these, she believes that on this occasion the gauge reads ‘F’ and ‘F’ is 
true.  This last proposition entails that, on this occasion, the gauge’s reading is accurate.  
Roxanne repeats her inference pattern again and again, and concludes, by induction, that 
the gauge is reliable.  Vogel claims that at each step reliabilism implies that Roxanne 
knows that her beliefs are true.  It implies that she can know her gauge reads accurately 
because a reliable process so indicates, namely the gauge reading itself.  And, assuming 
induction is reliable, it implies that she can now put several such beliefs together so as to 
know her gauge is reliable.  Since Roxanne’s bootstrapping is objectionable, yet 
permitted by reliabilism, we should reject reliabilism. 
Vogel’s example is flawed.  The reliability of a gauge is not reliably indicated 
merely by accurate readings on a number of occasions, no matter how large the number.  
Nor are such readings the basis for a saliently strong inductive inference—one capable of 
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generating knowledge.  Maybe my gauge is stuck on ‘empty,’ and my car has been up on 
blocks, with an empty tank, for years, during which time I check the gauge twice daily, 
and each time the gauge reads ‘empty.’  My sample of readings is simply not 
representative.  Only its repeated accurate readings in saliently diverse sorts of 
circumstances could reliably indicate its reliability and form the basis for an inductive 
inference that positions us to know the gauge is reliable. 
To help Vogel out, we can reconstruct his example.  The reconstruction begins 
like the original:  Roxanne believes p because her gauge, which is reliable, indicates p.  
She gathers many similar beliefs, attained because of the gauge’s readings.  She adds the 
premise that the readings were taken in saliently varied circumstances.  She then infers, 
via induction, that her gauge is reliable. 
 Let us assume, for the time being, that reasoning involving bootstrapping is 
flawed, and that reliabilism tolerates bootstrapped knowledge.  We have said that this is a 
strike against reliabilism only if there is a plausible way to rule out bootstrapped 
knowledge.  Is there a way? 
Vogel thinks there is.  He wants to revive the traditional view that knowledge 
entails justification:  Roxanne can know her gas level is such and such because her gauge 
says so only if she is justified in believing her gauge reliably indicates her gas level 
(622).  What she needs is an “independent reason to believe that the position of the 
needle on the gauge is reliably correlated with how much gas is in the tank.”  Since she 
must have such a reason at her disposal at the outset, she cannot bootstrap her way to 
knowledge.  Consider some reservations about Vogel’s suggestion.   
As Cohen notes, ‘easy knowledge’ is not limited to cases of bootstrapping.  If it is 
too easy for Roxanne to know her gauge is reliable, it is also too ‘easy’ to know not-
white, a table is not white with red light shining on it, by deducing it from red, the table is 
red, where the latter is believed spontaneously via perception, a reliable process.  
Assuming that knowledge in the Table Case qualifies as ‘easy,’ then Vogel needs a way 
to preclude it.   
Vogel’s view would be this: what has gone wrong is that Ted does not have a 
justified belief that his knowledge source, which is his color vision, is reliable, hence he 
does not know it is reliable.  Let’s adjust the example accordingly.  Assume that Ted 
believes his vision is generally reliable, and that his belief is justified. Unfortunately, 
even under these circumstances, it seems that Ted too easily knows not-white. The 
adjusted example is not made unproblematic by Ted’s justified belief in the reliability of 
his vision.   
Why does Ted’s knowledge still seem too “easy”?  Because Ted’s being in a 
position to know red depends on the truth of not-white.  Hence Ted’s knowing not-white 
upon deducing it from red seems suspiciously circular, and this appearance is not 
eliminated by the assumption that Ted has a justified belief that his color vision is 
generally reliable. 
The point can be made clearer if we distinguish between two senses in which 
color vision might be reliable. Even though color vision is generally reliable, there are 
circumstances in which it is useless, and Ted’s knowing his table is red depends on his 
not being in such circumstances.  For example, color vision does not work well in 
nonstandard lighting conditions, such as when a white table is illuminated by red light. 
There is a type of reliability it lacks in nonstandard lighting conditions, and only when it 
 4 
has this type of reliability will it produce knowledge.  For convenience, I will say it lacks 
specific reliability.  Refinements aside, a source is generally reliable when the beliefs it 
endorses would be true if it were used in a wide variety of actual circumstances, while a 
source is specifically reliable when the beliefs it endorses would be true if it were used 
specifically in circumstances like those at hand.  Specific reliability is necessary for 
knowledge (Luper 1987b).  That is the upshot of Gettier’s paper.  The general reliability 
of Ted’s vision did not depend on (or support) not-white.  However, the specific 
reliability of Ted’s vision did depend on the fact that not-white.  Hence the assumption 
that vision is generally reliable does not remove the appearance of circularity involved in 
Ted’s knowing not-white on the basis of red.   
(Conceivably, Vogel might respond by claiming that, to know red, Ted needs to 
know, hence justifiably believe, that his color vision is specifically reliable.  However, as 
I will suggest in below, down this road lies skepticism.)  
 Vogel’s reverse strategy has not succeeded; he has not provided us with a 
plausible way to nip easy knowledge in the bud.  In part this failure is due to the fact that 
he has underestimated the problem of easy knowledge.  In what follows I will attempt to 
characterize its essential feature.  If I am correct, we cannot rule out the possibility of 
easy knowledge without either abandoning closure or adopting an analysis with 
unacceptable skeptical consequences.  Assuming that neither alternative is acceptable, we 
can conclude that sometimes knowledge just is easy. 
So why does it seem counterintuitive to say that Ted and Roxanne know that the 
things they believe are true?  The best explanation, I suggest, turns on the fact that these 
cases seem to involve reasoning from a proposition to something that grounds that very 
proposition, in this sense:  g grounds p for person S just in case g’s truth is instrumental 
to S’s knowing p.  Let us say that such reasoning is pseudocircular (Luper 2005 and 
2006).  It seems counterintuitive to say that knowledge can depend essentially on 
pseudocircular reasoning, as it would in the case of Ted and Roxanne, and therefore 
counterintuitive to attribute knowledge to Ted and Roxanne.   (To allow for the 
possibility of believing something through multiple sources, we should put the 
explanation this way:  knowing a belief is true requires having at least one source that 
does not involve pseudocircular reasoning, yet Ted’s and Roxanne’s beliefs have no such 
source.  In the interest of simplicity, I will not pursue this alternative explanation.) 
My explanation makes reference to truths that are “instrumental to” our knowing 
things.  I choose this admittedly vague terminology deliberately, so that my explanation 
will not presuppose the truth of any particular theory of knowledge.  Different theorists 
will have different views about when it is that a proposition’s truth is instrumental to 
one’s knowing things.  By way of illustration, consider the following points about the 
Table Case, which, I think, are fairly uncontroversial.  Ted’s knowledge source is roughly 
his visual process.  By this process Ted knows things only if under his circumstances 
vision is sufficiently reliable.  Its being sufficiently reliable depends on the truth of 
various propositions; each such proposition is instrumental towards Ted’s knowing things 
through his source.  An example is the proposition that it is false that Ted’s table is white 
and illuminated by a red light.  Proposition g grounds our knowing p when p’s source’s 
requisite reliability hinges on g’s truth.  Next consider propositions that defeat reasoning 
that is essential to someone’s believing p (without justifying a false belief thereby):  the 
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negation of any such defeater is instrumental towards her knowing p on the basis of that 
reasoning. 
I know of no clearer general account of the propositions that ground knowledge.  
The possible accounts that come to mind seem flawed.  For example, suppose we say that 
g grounds p for person S just in case: 
(S knows p) entails g. 
But I know fishes, fishes live in water, and my knowing fishes entails each of the many 
things which fishes itself entails, such as that either fishes live in water or the moon hit 
my eye like a pizza pie, yet few—certainly not all—of these propositions play a role in 
my knowing fishes.   
A better account says that g grounds p for person S just in case: 
(S knows p) entails (or perhaps materially implies) g but p does not entail g. 
Yet this account eliminates propositions which appear to be implicated in the hard cases.  
For example, Sam’s knowing not-(not-car & dreaming) on the basis of car is considered 
too easy by many theorists, such as Harman, even though the latter entails the former.   
 Or should we say that not-dreaming, and not not-(not-car & dreaming), grounds 
Sam’s knowledge that car holds?  We might say that the former (like my brain is not 
having manufactured experiences) is the negation of a core skeptical hypothesis, and the 
latter (like I’m not a detached brain on the far planet Crouton having manufactured 
experiences) is the negation of a trivial consequence of that hypothesis.  Perhaps Sam’s 
knowing that car holds is grounded by the falsity of the core skeptical hypothesis, but not 
by not-(not-car & dreaming).  We have already said that a proposition may play a role in 
our knowing something even if some of its consequences do not.  Suppose we say that 
while knowing things may be grounded by the falsity of core skeptical hypotheses, it is 
not grounded by the falsity of their trivial consequences.  If something like this core 
thesis holds, we can dismiss the claim that Sam too easily knows not-(not-car & 
dreaming) as an illusion resulting from a failure to see that this proposition is not really 
instrumental to his knowing car.  Knowing not-(not-car & dreaming) wholly on the basis 
of one’s knowledge that car holds is no more problematic than knowing I have at least 
one hand wholly on the basis of my knowledge that I have two.  We can also say that the 
Table and Car Cases are no threat to K.  Given K, Ted better be in a position to know not-
white if he knows red, and Sam better be set to know not-(not-car & dreaming) if he 
knows car, but that is no problem if the former do not ground the latter.  Ted may be in 
no position to know that his table is not being illuminated by red light even though he 
knows red, and Sam may be unable to know that he is not dreaming although he knows 
car, since (among other things) the former ground the latter, but that is entirely consistent 
with K (contrast K with Moore’s principle, discussed in Luper 2007).  I expect that most 
theorists will not accept the core thesis, and I will not rely on it in what follows. 
 The hard cases will be problematic to those who think that a proposition cannot be 
known on the basis of something it grounds (and who reject the core thesis).  In Vogel’s 
example, it is bootstrapping that is pseudocircular.  A belief’s truth can be known only if 
its source is generally reliable.  Roxanne’s gauge’s readings position her to know things 
only if its readings are reliable.  So if these things (which her gauge tells her) are her 
reasons for believing that her gauge is reliable, her reasoning is pseudocircular.   
I suggest that if we accept K, and reject skepticism and the core thesis, we will 
have to tolerate pseudocircularity (compare Van Cleve 2003).  To rule out 
 6 
pseudocircularity compatibly with K, we will have to accept something like the following 
Independence Condition: 
If S knows k, and proposition g is instrumental to S’s knowing k, then S knows g, 
and k is not instrumental to S’s knowing g. 
Equivalently: 
If proposition g grounds k for S, then S knows g, and k does not ground g for S. 
The Independence Condition blocks pseudocircular sources of knowledge:  given the 
Independence Condition, nothing that grounds a bit of knowledge may be known on the 
basis of that bit of knowledge.  The Independence Condition is also consistent with 
closure:  each consequence of a bit of knowledge k must be known independently if it 
grounds k, but may be known on the basis of k if it does not ground k.   
 Instead of the Independence Condition, why not adopt a weaker principle that 
allows us to know a proposition k without independently knowing the truth of something 
g that grounds k so long as k does not entail g?  The following principle is weaker in 
precisely this way:   
If proposition g grounds k for S, and k entails g, then S knows g, and k does not 
ground g for S.   
This, the Consequence Independence Condition, like its predecessor, precludes Ted’s 
knowing it is false that his table is white and illuminated by red light because it follows 
from the fact that his table is red.  Yet the Consequence Independence Condition allows 
Ted to know his table is red without independently knowing that it is not illuminated by 
red light, even though the latter grounds the former, since the table’s being red does not 
entail that it is not illuminated by red light.  However, it is difficult to see how the 
exceptions allowed by the Consequence Independence Condition would be motivated:  if 
knowing that his table is red requires his independently knowing that it is not white and 
illuminated by red light, why shouldn’t it also require his independently knowing that it is 
not illuminated by red light?  (As noted earlier, if we were to say that only one of these 
two grounds Ted’s knowing red, it would be more plausible to pick the table’s not being 
illuminated by red light, rather than the falsity of its being white and illuminated by red 
light.)   
I have said that the Independence Condition allows us to ban pseudocircularity 
while retaining closure.  Unfortunately, however, if we rely on the Independence 
Condition to reconcile closure with the ban on pseudocircularity, we must pay a price:  
namely, skepticism concerning ordinary cases of knowledge.   
Here’s why:  The Independence Condition requires that, to know his table is red, 
Ted must know that his vision is specifically reliable, and that none of the circumstances 
in which it is not specifically reliable obtain.  It also requires that he knows these things 
in a way that is independent of any knowledge which his vision gives him with their help, 
such as his knowledge that his table is red.  But that means Ted does not know his table is 
red, since he didn’t try to eliminate the many possibilities that would undermine the 
specific reliability of his vision.  For example, he did not attempt to establish that he is 
not having visual hallucinations involving tables.  (In the Table Case Ted did conclude 
that it is false that his table is white and illuminated by a red light, but he did not try to 
establish this independently of his knowledge that his table is red.)  Now consider Sam.  
To establish not-(not-car & dreaming), Sam must establish either car or not-dreaming.  
To do so without relying on car, he will need to establish not-dreaming.  But he didn’t 
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even attempt this.  So he does not know car.  Yet on anyone’s list of ordinary cases of 
knowledge, Ted’s belief red and Sam’s belief car would appear.  And, like Ted and Sam, 
most of us, most of the time, do not really know ordinary empirical truths, since we don’t 
try to rule out possibilities such as not-dreaming.   
 That most of us most of the time do not know commonsense empirical truths is an 
extremely counterintuitive skeptical consequence.  Of course, things could be worse.  It 
could turn out that we cannot know such truths.  And in fact the Independence Condition 
might well make it impossible for us to know ordinary empirical truths.  In effect, the 
Independence Condition demands, of any knowledge source, that it be checked out, in the 
sense that we must come to know that it is specifically reliable, and that the truths on 
which that reliability depends hold.  If all putative knowledge sources have to be checked 
out in order for them to give us knowledge, where will we get the knowledge to do the 
checking?  Here we face the standard skeptical trilemma.  Our efforts to check our 
sources will begin with assumptions whose truth we do not know, or regress indefinitely, 
or they will involve some sort of circularity which the Independence Condition rejects.  
Consider that all five senses will lack specific reliability if certain skeptical hypotheses 
hold, such as our suffering a complex set of hallucinations affecting all of our senses.  
Given the Independence Condition we cannot use visual knowledge to verify that these 
hallucinations are not undermining our visual sense.  Nor may we use tactile knowledge 
to confirm that the hallucinations are not undermining our tactile sense.  Can we use 
visual knowledge to verify that they are not undermining our tactile sense, and tactile 
knowledge to verify that they are not undermining our visual sense?  Apparently not; to 
have visual knowledge we must not be suffering the hallucinations; if we use our visual 
knowledge to verify something that in turn confirms that we are not suffering the 
hallucinations, we violate the Independence Condition.  
 
The Hard Argument and Lotteryesque Propositions 
Reverse arguments, such as the one rejected in the previous section, are relatively recent 
additions to the epistemological literature.  Hard arguments came first.  One version of 
the hard argument is very well known (Robert Nozick 1981; Fred Dretske 1970, 2003, 
2005):  Let us say that a proposition is elusive if and only if our experiences would 
remain the same if the proposition were false.  For example, not-white is true, and Ted 
has certain experiences which he would still have if white were true.  According to the 
argument from elusiveness, we fail to know of elusive propositions that they are true 
even if we believe them because we see that they are entailed by things we know, so we 
should reject K.  By now the argument from elusiveness is well criticized.  I will not 
discuss it further.  Instead, I will consider a version of the hard argument that attempts to 
use lottery propositions and lotteryesque propositions against the principle of closure. 
 The paradigm case of a lottery proposition is not-win, the ticket in my hand—one 
of the ten million issued in the state lottery that will end tonight—is not the winner.  
What is distinctive about these propositions is that, normally, they are supportable only 
on the grounds that they are highly likely.  For example, to support my claim that my 
ticket will lose, normally I would cite the fact that the probability is very high, albeit less 
than 1.  As Jonathan Vogel (1990) and other theorists (see especially Hawthorne 2006) 
have noted, some propositions that do not actually involve lotteries still resemble lottery 
propositions in that they can be assigned a probability that is less than 1.  Let us say that 
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these propositions are lotteryesque.  For example, not-stolen, my automobile has not been 
stolen and taken south of the border, seems lotteryesque given the statistics concerning 
stolen vehicles in the U.S., relative to which the probability of not-stolen is less than 1, 
even if very high.   
 Lottery propositions cannot be known solely on the grounds that their truth is 
highly likely (Harman 1968).  To insist that they can be known on this basis raises the 
specter of Kyburg’s (1961) lottery paradox.  Consider, too, that it is unacceptable to say 
both ‘I know p’ and ‘p might be false,’ in the epistemic sense of ‘might.’  Yet any lottery 
proposition might be false in the epistemic sense.   
As several theorists have noticed, we can avoid paradox and explain why we 
normally fail to know lottery propositions if we say that knowing p requires believing p 
because of something that establishes p’s truth.  This view of knowledge has received 
different but closely related formulations:   Dretske (1971) said knowledge requires 
having a conclusive reason for thinking that what we believe is true; David Armstrong 
(1973, p. 187) said “knowledge requires a belief-state which ensures truth;” and Sherman 
and Harman (2004, p. 492) say “one knows only if one believes as one does because of 
something that settles the truth of that belief.”  Proponents of the safe indication account 
of knowledge (e.g., Luper 1984, 2003a; Sosa 2000) will also say we know things only if 
we believe as we do on grounds that establish truth.  On this account we know p only if 
we believe p on the basis of an event or state of affairs R that safely indicates p’s truth, 
where R safely indicates p’s truth only if the following subjunctive conditional is true:  
p would hold if R held. 
On each of these approaches, we fail to know things, including lottery propositions, when 
our sole basis for believing them is their high likelihood.   
It is presumably because normally we simply do not know lottery propositions 
that some theorists consider them ‘hard.’  Their hardness is not much of a threat to K, 
however, since it is not obvious that there are mundane knowledge claims that entail 
genuine lottery propositions.  Consider not-buy, I will not buy a 10 million dollar villa in 
the French Riviera tomorrow, since I lack the means, and the conditional, if win then buy, 
i.e., tomorrow I will buy the villa if I win the state lottery tonight.  If not-buy and if win 
then buy are among the things I know, K is under pressure, since these entail not-win, so 
that, given K, I can easily know not-win.  More precisely, what is under pressure here is 
not K but rather the following stronger principle: 
GK: If, while knowing various propositions, S believes p because S knows that 
they entail p, then S knows p. 
But the proponent of GK is well positioned to argue that I do not know not-buy.  One 
reason I fail to know it is precisely that its truth depends, in part, on whether I win the 
lottery, and I do not know I will not (compare Harman 1986, p. 71). 
 However, this strategy fails as applied to the wider group of lotteryesque 
propositions.  It is relatively uncontroversial that I know ford, my 1969 Ford 100 is 
parked in my garage downstairs.  But ford entails the lotteryesque proposition not-stolen, 
so that, given K, the latter is easily known.  And friends of K cannot plausibly respond by 
denying that I know ford.  Too many of the propositions that we quite clearly know entail 
lotteryesque propositions.   
 A better strategy is to emphasize that genuine lottery propositions are normally 
supportable only on the grounds that their truth is highly likely whereas lotteryesque 
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propositions may be supportable on grounds that establish their truth.  While lotteryesque 
propositions can be based on probabilistic grounds, their truth cannot be known on such 
grounds.  But they can also be believed because of something that establishes their truth, 
and hence they can be known. My belief not-stolen is not based on crime statistics; if it 
were, I would not know that it is true, since on this basis my belief is at best highly likely.  
Featuring prominently among my grounds is my observation O:  I only just parked my 
Ford downstairs. It would not be true that O establishes that not-stolen holds in 
Gettierized circumstances; for example, O would not do the trick if there were car thieves 
at work in my neighborhood, if I had a son with his own pair of keys who, unbeknownst 
to me, is about to drive off in my car, and so forth.  But under common circumstances, O 
establishes that not-stolen and that ford holds.   
We may draw a similar conclusion about genuine lottery propositions.  They 
cannot be known to be true if believed solely because they are highly likely.  But they can 
be known in unusual circumstances.  To know not-win, I would have to know my ticket is 
counterfeit, or that the lottery is rigged against me, or the like.  When S believes p upon 
seeing (knowing) it is entailed by something S knows, let us say that p is knowledge 
secured.  Lotteryesque propositions are rarely knowledge secured, but when they are, 
their truth is known.   
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